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Let |0〉 and |1〉 be two states that are promised to come from known subsets of orthogonal
subspaces, but are otherwise unknown. Our paper probes the question of what can be
achieved with respect to the basis {|0〉 , |1〉}⊗n of n logical qubits, given only a few copies
of the unknown states |0〉 and |1〉. A phase-invariant operator is one that is unchanged
under the relative phase-shift |1〉 7→ eiθ |1〉, for any θ, of all of the n qubits. We show
that phase-invariant unitary operators can be implemented exactly with no copies and
that phase-invariant states can be prepared exactly with at most n copies each of |0〉 and
|1〉; we give an explicit algorithm for state preparation that is efficient for some classes
of states (e.g. symmetric states). We conjecture that certain non-phase-invariant oper-
ations are impossible to perform accurately without many copies. Motivated by optical
implementations of quantum computers, we define “quantum computation in a hidden
basis” to mean executing a quantum algorithm with respect to the phase-shifted hidden
basis {|0〉 , eiθ |1〉}, for some potentially unknown θ; we give an efficient approximation
algorithm for this task, for which we introduce an analogue of a coherent state of light,
which serves as a bounded quantum phase reference frame encoding θ. Our motivation
was quantum-public-key cryptography, however the techniques are general. We apply our
results to quantum-public-key authentication protocols, by showing that a natural class
of digital signature schemes for classical messages is insecure. We also give a protocol
for identification that uses many of the ideas discussed and whose security relates to our
conjecture (but we do not know if it is secure).
1 Introduction
We consider a new quantum-information-theoretic problem; let us first define the problem and
then summarize our results and their significance.
Suppose S is a d-dimensional complex vector space with computational basis B = {|i〉 : i =
0, 1, . . . , d − 1}. Assume that we have the ability to do universal quantum computation (with
respect to B) in S. Let S0 = span(B0) and S1 = span(B1) be two orthogonal subspaces of S
∗lmi@iqc.ca
†mmosca@iqc.ca
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such that
S = S0 ⊕ S1 (1)
and B = B0∪B1, where the union of the orthonormal bases B0 and B1 is disjoint. Assume that
B0 and B1 are known, so that we can perform universal quantum computation with respect to
each of them. For all b ∈ {0, 1}, let Ab be a set of pure state vectors,
Ab ⊂ Sb, (2)
whose classical description is known, such that no two elements in Ab are equal up to global
phase.
Definition 1 (Hidden basis). Let |0〉 be a state in A0 and let |1〉 be a state in A1, where A0
and A1 are defined above. These states define a hidden (computational) basis {|0〉 , |1〉}⊗n of n
logical qubits. We call this a “hidden basis” since in general the choices of |0〉 and |1〉 will not
be known.
Remark 1 (Notation). We use boldfaced ket-labels to denote the elements of a hidden basis.
Assuming the ability to do universal quantum computation in Sn := S⊗n (with respect to the
computational basis B⊗n of n d-dimensional qudits), we investigate the number of copies of |0〉
and |1〉 that are required to perform unitary operations and to prepare quantum states defined
with respect to the hidden basis {|0〉 , |1〉}⊗n. Note that the question is well defined by virtue
of the known classical descriptions of A0 and A1, which disambiguate the global phases of the
states |0〉 and |1〉.
In Section 2, we show that any phase-invariant (see Definition 2) unitary operator on our n
logical qubits is exactly implementable without requiring any copies of the states |0〉 and |1〉.
We then show (see Theorem 1) that any phase-invariant density operator on n logical qubits is
exactly preparable from at most n copies each of |0〉 and |1〉. We then give an explicit, efficient
algorithm for creating symmetric states, based on Ref. [1], that easily generalizes to creating any
phase-invariant state. For non-phase-invariant unitary operators, such as the logical Hadamard
gate, we conjecture that a large number of copies of |0〉 and |1〉 is needed; we give a precise
conjecture, in a simplified framework, in the Appendix. Our conjecture adds to the important
discussion of what can and cannot be done in quantum mechanics. Knowing the limitations
of a physical (computational) theory is intrinsically interesting, but no-go theorems can also
be used as building blocks for other useful results. As an example of how one might use this
conjecture for a new kind of cryptographic protocol, in Section 4 we present a cryptographic
protocol for identification and explain how our conjecture relates to its security.
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Note that, in practice, performing a quantum computation in the basis {|0〉, |1〉}⊗n, for
the known qubit-states |0〉 and |1〉, is actually equivalent to performing a computation in the
phase-shifted basis {|0〉, eiφ|1〉}⊗n, where one replaces |1〉 with eiφ|1〉 in all the operations. For
example, in optical implementations, one typically assumes that a laser outputs coherent states∑∞
w=0(γ
w/
√
w!)|w〉 with a random, unknown, but consistent, phase parameter φ = arg(γ) (see,
e.g., Ref. [2]). When using these coherent states to drive transformations in the qubits, this is
equivalent to performing the entire computation in the basis {|0〉, eiφ|1〉}⊗n. It is essential that
the experimentalist maintains a consistent phase reference for the duration of the computation,
but the actual value of φ is unimportant. Thus, in Section 3, we consider the problem of quan-
tum computing with respect to the phase-shifted hidden basis {|0〉 , eiθ |1〉}⊗n for potentially
unknown θ ∈ [0, 2π). We show (see Theorem 2) that it is possible to approximate universal
quantum computation in the phase-shifted hidden basis {|0〉 , eiθ |1〉}⊗n, given a small phase
reference state encoding θ (see Definition 4) that is analogous to a coherent light state. It
follows (see Corollary 6) that, by using a small number of copies of |0〉 and |1〉, one can prepare
such a phase reference state for unknown and uniformly random θ and thus carry out approxi-
mate universal computation in the phase-shifted hidden basis {|0〉 , eiθ |1〉}⊗n for unknown and
uniformly random θ, in analogy to the optical implementation described above.
Our motivation for considering computing in a hidden basis is rooted in quantum-public-key
cryptography, a framework, introduced in Ref. [3], in which the public keys are copies of a par-
ticular quantum state encoding a classical private key.3 The goal of this type of cryptography
is to achieve the best of both the quantum and classical worlds: the information-theoretic se-
curity of several known quantum cryptographic protocols (e.g. quantum key distribution [4, 5]
and symmetric-key message-authentication [6]) and the advantages (over symmetric-key cryp-
tography) of a modern public-key infrastructure (see e.g. Ref. [7] for details). Unfortunately,
it has been shown in Ref. [6] that it is generally impossible to sign arbitrary quantum states,
which means that such a quantum public-key infrastructure may be difficult (if not impossi-
ble) to attain. Nevertheless, it is important to determine to what extent quantum-public-key
cryptography is feasible.
Our focus in this paper is on authentication schemes, where the owner, Alice, of the private
key attempts to prove to another party, based on the assumption that this party has an au-
thentic copy of Alice’s public key, that it is indeed Alice who constructed a certain message (in
the case of a digital signature scheme) or participated in a particular interaction4 (in the case
of an identification scheme). The only known secure quantum-public-key signature scheme is
the one-time digital signature scheme for classical messages in Ref. [3]; the scheme is one-time
3Note that the number of copies in public circulation must be limited, so that an adversary at the very least
cannot take all the copies, measure them, and get a sufficiently good estimate of the private key.
4Such an interaction is assumed not to be susceptible to a man-in-the-middle attack [7].
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in that it can only be used to sign one message securely before the public keys need to be
refreshed. A natural next step is thus to find a “reusable” quantum digital signature scheme
for classical messages or prove none exists. In the context of authentication schemes, we define
reusable to mean that Alice can use the same private key to sign many different messages or
prove her identity many times, but a fresh copy of the public key is needed for each verification
instance. In Section 4, we describe a rather natural and general cryptographic framework, based
on hidden bases, that may be suitable for reusable quantum-public-key authentication schemes.
We show (see Corollary 9) how our abovementioned state preparation result is a cryptanalytic
tool, rendering insecure a class of quantum digital signature schemes within the framework,
thus effectively extending the original no-go theorem for quantum digital signatures in Ref. [6].
Finally, in an attempt to stimulate further research in reusable quantum-public-key authenti-
cation schemes, we give a protocol for identification that uses many of the ideas discussed (but
we do not know if the protocol is secure).
2 Phase-invariant operators
Let H denote the span of {|0〉 , |1〉}; thus, Hn := H⊗n denotes the span of the hidden basis for
n logical qubits:
Hn = span({|0〉 , |1〉}⊗n). (3)
For any bit-string y = y1y2 · · · yn ∈ {0, 1}n, let
|y〉 := |y1〉 |y2〉 · · · |yn〉 . (4)
For any θ ∈ [0, 2π], let U(θ) be the phase-shift by θ (with respect to the basis {|y〉 : y ∈
{0, 1}n}) operator on Hn such that
U(θ) : |y〉 7→ eiH(y)θ |y〉 , (5)
where H(y) :=
∑
j yj is the Hamming weight of y.
Definition 2 (Phase invariant). Let T be any operator onHn. Then T is phase(-shift) invariant
(with respect to {|y〉 : y ∈ {0, 1}n}) if and only if
U(θ)TU(θ)† = T (6)
for all θ ∈ [0, 2π].
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Define the weight of |y〉 to be H(y), and define the weight-w subspace of Hn as
Hnw := span({|x〉 ∈ Hn : H(x) = w}). (7)
Fact 2. A linear operator T on Hn is phase invariant if and only if it is block diagonal with
respect to the decomposition Hn = ⊕nw=0Hnw.
Proof. Writing T =
∑
y,z Ty,z|y〉〈z| and U(θ) =
∑
x e
iH(x)θ|x〉〈x|, it is easy to show that
U(θ)TU(θ)† =
∑
y,z
eiθ(H(y)−H(z))Ty,z|y〉〈z| (8)
and thus Eq. (6) may be rewritten
Ty,z = e
iθ(H(y)−H(z))Ty,z, for all y, z ∈ {0, 1}n. (9)
If T is block diagonal, then the equality in Eq. (9) holds for all θ when H(y) 6= H(z) because
Ty,z = 0; this equality always holds for all θ when H(y) = H(z). To prove the other direction,
note that, if H(y) 6= H(z) and Eq. (9) holds for all θ, then Ty,z must be zero (otherwise one
could divide both sides by Ty,z and get a contradiction for some value of θ).
2.1 Exact implementation/preparation of phase-invariant unitary/density
operators
The following lemma implies that, despite our limited knowledge about |0〉 and |1〉, we can
exactly implement any phase-invariant unitary operator V on Hn, given its matrix (explicitly)
with respect to the hidden basis. The lemma guarantees that we can find a matrix represen-
tation of V with respect to the computational basis B⊗n of Sn, and then use this to effect V
on Hn; this implementation of V is algorithmically exact (though, in practice, error correction
would likely need to be used; we assume perfect quantum channels throughout this paper).
Lemma 3. Given the matrix representation of a phase-invariant unitary operator V on Hn
with respect to the hidden basis {|0〉, |1〉}⊗n, one can compute the matrix representation of an
operator V ′ on Sn with respect to the computational basis B⊗n, such that V ′ |Hn = V .
Proof. Since V is phase invariant, Fact 2 implies it is block diagonal with respect to ⊕nw=0Hnw,
and can thus be written V = ⊕nw=0Vw, for Vw unitary on Hnw. Let {|w, z〉 : z = 1, 2, . . . ,
(
n
w
)}
be the natural ordered basis for Hnw, that is, |w, z〉 ∈ {|0〉, |1〉}⊗n for all (w, z). The operator
Vw is specified by
(
n
w
)
equations of the form
|w, z〉 7→
(nw)∑
k=1
cwk,z |w, k〉 , (10)
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which we can read off the given matrix for V . If, for each z ∈ {1, 2, . . . , (n
w
)}, we fix πwz to be
any permutation on n objects5 such that∣∣πwz (0n−w1w)〉 = |w, z〉 , (11)
we can rewrite Eq. (10) as
∣∣πwz (0n−w1w))〉 7→
(nw)∑
k=1
cwk,z
∣∣πwk (0n−w1w)〉 . (12)
Let Snw denote the “weight-w” subspace of S
n:
Snw := span{|πwz (c)〉 ∈ Sn : z ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,
(
n
w
)
}, c ∈ (B0)n−w × (B1)w}. (13)
It suffices to show how to compute the matrix representation with respect to B⊗n of a unitary
operator V ′w on S
n
w such that V
′
w |Hnw = Vw, for each w; thus, fix w.
Assuming d0 := dimS0 and d1 := dimS1, we can substitute into Eq. (12) the two equations
|0〉 :=
d0∑
i=1
αi |ai〉 , |1〉 :=
d1∑
j=1
βj |bj〉 , (14)
where B0 = {|ai〉}i and B1 = {|bj〉}j , and get, after changing the order of summations,∑
i1,...,in−w
∑
j1,...,jw
αi1 · · ·αin−wβj1 · · ·βjw
∣∣πwz (ai1 , . . . , ain−w , bj1, . . . , bjw)〉 (15)
7→
∑
i1,...,in−w
∑
j1,...,jw
αi1 · · ·αin−wβj1 · · ·βjw


(nw)∑
k=1
cwk,z
∣∣πwk (ai1 , . . . , ain−w , bj1, . . . , bjw)〉

 . (16)
Consider the mapping defined by the
(
n
w
)
dn−w0 d
w
1 equations of the form
∣∣πwz (ai1 , . . . , ain−w , bj1, . . . , bjw)〉 7→
(nw)∑
k=1
cwk,z
∣∣πwk (ai1 , . . . , ain−w , bj1, . . . , bjw)〉 (17)
5Here, the n objects will be the n components of a vector (that functions as the label for a ket). A binary
string is considered a vector of zeros and ones.
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for all |ail〉 ∈ {|ai〉}i (for all l = 1, 2, . . . , n− w), for all |bjl′ 〉 ∈ {|bj〉}j (for all l′ = 1, 2, . . . , w),
and for all z = 1, 2, . . .
(
n
w
)
. We claim that this mapping well-defines a suitable V ′w. Indeed, it
is easy to see that the dn−w0 d
w
1 subspaces (indexed by (i1, . . . , in−w, j1, . . . , jw))
span{|πwz (ai1 , . . . , ain−w , bj1 , . . . , bjw)〉 : z ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,
(
n
w
)
}} (18)
are mutually orthogonal, and that the mapping is unitary on each of these subspaces by unitarity
of Vw. Since dimS
n
w =
(
n
w
)
dn−w0 d
w
1 , the mapping well-defines a unitary operator on S
n
w. The
matrix entries for V ′w can be read off of Eqs (17).
Lemma 3 allows us to prove the following theorem, which implies that, despite our limited
knowledge of |0〉 and |1〉, we can prepare a copy of any phase-invariant density operator on Hn,
given its matrix with respect to the hidden basis.
Theorem 1 (Exact preparation of phase-invariant states). Given the matrix representation of
a phase-invariant density operator ρ on Hn with respect to the hidden basis {|0〉, |1〉}⊗n, one
can prepare a copy of ρ using at most n copies each of |0〉 and |1〉.
Proof. Lemma 3 implies that, in order to prepare any phase-invariant pure state |φ〉 ∈ Hnw, it
suffices to have (n− w) copies of |0〉 and w copies of |1〉. To see this, note that there exists a
unitary operator Uw on Hnw mapping
|0〉⊗(n−w)|1〉⊗w 7→ |φ〉 , (19)
and that Uw is (trivially) phase invariant. Since ρ is just a probabilistic distribution of phase-
invariant pure states (because it is block diagonal), it follows that ρ is preparable using at most
n copies each of |0〉 and |1〉 (assuming one can sample from this probability distribution).
2.2 Algorithm for exact state preparation of phase-invariant states
Theorem 1 does not address the question of efficiency. Indeed, in some cases, the required
unitary operation (denoted Uw in the proof) is efficient, as demonstrated by the following
example.
Let |Snw〉 be the normalized symmetric sum of all
(
n
w
)
states in {|0〉 , |1〉}⊗n that have weight
w:
|Snw〉 :=
1√(
n
w
) ∑
x∈{0,1}n:H(x)=w
|x〉 . (20)
As we now explain, the algorithm for state generation in Ref. [1] can be adapted to transform
|0〉⊗(n−w)|1〉⊗w 7→ |Snw〉. (21)
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Fix n and assume 0 < w < n. Hypothetically, suppose we had a copy of |Snw〉 and we measured
the registers one-by-one from the left in the basis {|0〉 , |1〉}. Denote the binary outcome of
measuring a register by 0 (if the register was in state |0〉) or 1 (if the register was in state
|1〉). Let Xi, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, denote the random variable representing the outcome of
measuring register i (registers are enumerated from left to right). For j = 2, 3, . . . , n and for
any x ∈ {0, 1}j−1 and xj ∈ {0, 1}, define the probabilities
px := P (X1 · · ·Xj−1 = x) (22)
pxj |x := P (Xj = xj |X1 · · ·Xj−1 = x), (23)
where adjacent bit-values denote string-concatenation and we note that the definition of px
holds also for j = n+ 1. Then we have p1 = w/n = 1− p0 and
pxj |x = pxxj/px (24)
p1|x = (w −H(x))/(l − j + 1) (25)
= 1− p0|x. (26)
Define the shorthand notation, for nonnegative integers d and c ≥ d,
|d{c}〉 := |0〉⊗(c−d)|1〉⊗d. (27)
We can prepare |Snw〉 by starting with |w{n}〉, and then applying a sequence U1, U2, . . . , Un of
phase invariant unitary operators. The first operator will be
U1 : |w{n}〉 7→ √p0|0〉|w{n−1}〉+√p1|1〉|(w − 1){n−1}〉. (28)
For each j = 2, 3, . . . , n and for any x = x1x2 · · ·xj−1 ∈ {0, 1}j−1, we define the operators, for
any d ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r},
Uj : |x〉|d{n−(j−1)}〉 7→ |x〉
(√
p0|x|0〉|d{n−j}〉+√p1|x|1〉|(d− 1){n−j}〉
)
. (29)
Each Uj performs an operation similar to a root-swap operator
6, controlled on registers 1
through (j − 1), swapping register j with the next closest register to the right whose state is
orthogonal to the subspace containing |0〉. Our Uj also has built into it a final phase-clean-
up operation, controlled on registers 1 through j, which removes the imaginary factor of i
arising from the root-swap operation. We can now show that |Snw〉 = Un · · ·U2U1|w{n}〉. A
6For 0 < α < 1, we can define a root-swap-like operator, which maps |0〉|0〉 7→ |0〉|0〉, |0〉|1〉 7→ α|0〉|1〉 +
i
√
1− α2|1〉|0〉, |1〉|0〉 7→ i√1− α2|0〉|1〉+α|1〉|0〉, and |1〉|1〉 7→ |1〉|1〉. When α = 1/√2, this is the root-swap
operator.
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straightforward induction (similar to that in Ref. [1]) shows that, after Uj is applied, the state
of the n registers is ∑
x∈{0,1}j
√
px|x〉|(w −H(x)){n−j}〉 (30)
so that, after Un is applied, the state is
∑
x∈{0,1}n
√
px|x〉 = |Snw〉.
The above algorithm for creating |Snw〉 can be generalized to create any |η〉 ∈ Hnw (and
hence any phase-invariant density operator): it is clear that it can be generalized to create any
state in Hnw that has real coefficients; we refer to Ref. [1] for how to create the correct phases
of any complex coefficients of |η〉 efficiently. The general algorithm is efficient as long as the
conditional probabilities pxj |x are efficiently computable, as in the case of the symmetric states
|Snw〉.
Example 1. Consider the state ρ =
∫ 2pi
0
|ϕ(θ)〉〈ϕ(θ)|dθ, where
|ϕ(θ)〉 =
( |0〉+ eiθ|1〉√
2
)⊗n
=
1
2n/2
n∑
w=0
√(
n
w
)
eiwθ|Snw〉. (31)
We see that ρ is phase invariant and equal to
∑n
w=0
(
n
w
)
2−n|Snw〉〈Snw|. Theorem 1 implies we can
prepare ρ using at most n copies each of |0〉 and |1〉, and the above algorithm implies we can
do so efficiently.
2.3 Beyond phase invariance?
One may of course ask about unitary operators and quantum states that are not phase invariant.
Regarding the former, recall the finite universal set {H,S, T, c-Z} of gates [8], where
H =
1√
2
[
1 1
1 −1
]
, S =
[
1 0
0 i
]
, T =
[
1 0
0 eipi/4
]
, c-Z =


1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 −1

 , (32)
and the matrices are defined with respect to {|0〉 , |1〉} (in the case of the one-qubit gates) and
{|0〉 , |1〉}⊗2 (in the case of the c-Z gate). Since S, T , and c-Z are phase invariant, we see that
it is the presumed inability to implement the Hadamard gate H exactly that prevents us from
performing exact universal quantum computation in the hidden basis {|0〉 , |1〉}⊗n. Indeed, we
conjecture that, for worst-case A0 and A1 (recall their definitions in the Introduction), a large
number of copies of |0〉 ∈ A0 and |1〉 ∈ A1 are necessary to implement one Hadamard gate or
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to prepare one copy of (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2, if the implementation/preparation is well approximated
for every |0〉 ∈ A0 and every |1〉 ∈ A1; see Remark 7 and the Appendix for a precise conjecture
in a simplified framework.
3 Approximate universal computation in a hidden basis
Recall our discussion in the Introduction, where we noted that quantum computing with respect
to the hidden basis {|0〉 , |1〉}⊗n is equivalent to computing with respect to the phase-shifted
hidden basis {|0〉 , eiθ |1〉}⊗n, as long as θ is consistent throughout the entire computation.
Definition 3 (Quantum computation in a hidden basis). Let ρ0 be a density operator on Hn
and let W be a unitary operator on Hn. To carry out the quantum computation (of (ρ0,W ))
in the (phase-shifted) hidden basis {|0〉 , eiθ |1〉}⊗n means to effect the operation
ρ0 7→ ρ′0 := U(θ)WU(θ)†ρ0U(θ)W †U(θ)†, (33)
given a copy of ρ0 and a classical description of W . We say the computation is carried out
approximately, with fidelity
√
1− ǫ2, if we effect an operation ρ0 7→ ρ′′0 such that ρ′′0 has fidelity√
1− ǫ2 with ρ′0.
Remark 4 (Compatibility of phase references). In Definition 3, note that ρ′0 will be equivalent to
Wρ0W
† up to conjugation by U(θ) if ρ0 is phase invariant. More generally, if ρ0 = U(θ)σ0U(θ)
†
for some θ-independent σ0 on Hn, then ρ′0 will be equivalent to Wσ0W † up to conjugation by
U(θ). The latter condition (while including all phase-invariant ρ0, in which case ρ0 = σ0)
includes any non-phase-invariant ρ0 that is (somehow) already defined with respect to the phase-
angle θ, e.g., ρ0 = ((|0〉+ eiθ |1〉)(〈0|+ e−iθ 〈1|)/2)⊗n (corresponding to σ0 = ((|0〉+ |1〉)(〈0|+
〈1|)/2)⊗n).
Note that we have not unnecessarily complicated Definition 3 by including a notion of measure-
ment: any measurement can be expressed as an extra unitary operation (on a possibly larger
space) plus a projective measurement in the hidden computational basis {|0〉 , |1〉}⊗n; the extra
unitary operation may be absorbed into W and the projective measurement easily simulated
by measuring with respect to the computational basis of Sn.
We now show how we can achieve approximate universal quantum computation in the
hidden basis {|0〉 , eiθ |1〉}⊗n efficiently, given a phase reference state encoding θ that is used in
an analogous manner to how coherent light states are used to drive qubit transformations in
an optical implementation of a quantum computer.
Recalling the discussion in Section 2.3, we note that the set Cθ := {Hθ, S, T, c-Z} is universal
for quantum computation with respect to the phase-shifted hidden basis {|0〉 , eiθ |1〉}⊗n, where
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the phase-shifted Hadamard gate is defined as
Hθ :=
1√
2
[
1 e−iθ
eiθ −1
]
, (34)
where the matrix is with respect to the hidden basis {|0〉 , |1〉}. Since the other gates in Cθ are
phase invariant, it thus suffices that we show how to implement (approximately) the gate Hθ
many times, each time on an arbitrary input, and each time with respect to the same value of
unknown and uniformly random θ ∈ [0, 2π). We can actually implement, for any α ∈ [0, 1], the
generalized phase-shifted Hadamard gate
Hθ(α) : |0〉 7→ α|0〉+
√
1− α2eiθ|1〉 (35)
eiθ|1〉 7→
√
1− α2|0〉 − αeiθ|1〉. (36)
Just as before, we will make use of phase-invariant root-swap-like operations, which introduce
imaginary i factors; thus, it will be more convenient to directly implement the gate,
Gθ(α) : |0〉 7→ α|0〉+
√
1− α2ieiθ|1〉 (37)
|1〉 7→
√
1− α2ie−iθ|0〉+ α|1〉, (38)
and then we have, for example, ZSGθ(α)SZ = Hθ(α), where Z is the (phase-invariant) Pauli-Z
gate
Z =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
(39)
and S is defined in Eq. (32). Also, for clarity of exposition, we will assume α = 1/
√
2 (but we
will indicate in footnotes how the procedure is modified for general α). Let
Gθ := Gθ(1/
√
2). (40)
Consider how one might effect the gate Gθ, given some phase reference state that encodes
θ and presumably depends on |0〉 and |1〉. What form could such a state take? Inspired by a
coherent light state,
∑∞
w=0(γ
w/
√
w!)|w〉, we make the following definition.
Definition 4 (Phase reference state). For any θ ∈ [0, 2π) and positive integer t, a phase
reference state (having size t and encoding θ) is
|Ψtθ〉 :=
t∑
w=1
eiwθ|w{t}〉, (41)
where |w{t}〉 is defined in Eq. (27).
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Each occurrence of |1〉 (respectively, |0〉) in the state |w{t}〉 is analogous to one photon (respec-
tively, one vacuum). Thus, it will be convenient to refer to the state |w{t}〉 as a 1-number state,
in analogy with the photon-number state |w〉.7
Remark 5 (Freedom in definition of phase reference state). Note that since we are not restricted
to the standard interaction Hamiltonians present in Nature (because we are just mimicking such
interactions using a universal quantum computer), our version of the coherent states, as well
as how they interact with the other systems, looks slightly different; we need only mimic some
of the main properties of coherent light states, for example, that the argument (phase angle) of
successive coefficients scales linearly with the photon number. In general, to achieve an efficient
approximation, there is some freedom in the choice of the moduli of the coefficients of our phase
reference states. For clarity of presentation, we have chosen to use the simplest coefficients,
with constant modulus. However, one could specify a cost function and optimize the moduli
accordingly, with modest gain in the quality of the approximation.8
Define the phase-invariant controlled-root-swap gate U , which, for fixed t, acts on (t + 1)
equally-sized registers, and in particular operates as follows:
U : |0〉|a{t}〉 7→ |0〉|a{t}〉+ i|1〉|(a− 1){t}〉 (42)
|1〉|b{t}〉 7→ i|0〉|(b+ 1){t}〉+ |1〉|b{t}〉, (43)
for all a = 1, 2, . . . , t and all b = 0, 1, . . . , (t − 1).9 Let |φ〉 be an arbitrary one-logical-qubit
pure state to which we want to apply Gθ. Applying U to |φ〉|Ψtθ〉, the resulting state contains
the term √
t− 2
t
(Gθ|φ〉)
(
1√
t− 2
t−1∑
w=2
eiθw|w{t}〉
)
. (44)
7In the right-hand side of Eq. (41), we could have had the summation start at w = 0; we choose w = 1 to
make the analysis that follows cleaner, while not significantly affecting the quality of the approximation.
8States that are similar to our coherent-state analogues |Ψtθ〉 have independently been used in Ref. [9].
In their application, the phase parameter is not an issue. Rather, they use this property of coherent states
behaving more and more “classically”, i.e. with less and less disturbance to the coherent state, as the size t of
the coherent state gets larger. In their case, a larger coherent state corresponds to a larger amount of shared
entanglement, and they used this to show that more entanglement always improves the success probability of
their protocol. Generally, all such states are forms of “embezzling” states [10, 11].
9Here is a complete description of U : If the registers are enumerated 0, 1, . . . , t starting from the left, then
U applies the root-swap to registers 0 and j (for j ≥ 1) exactly when either registers 0 through (j − 1) are in
the state subspace containing |0〉 and registers j, . . . , t are in the subspace containing |1〉 or registers 1 through
j are in the subspace containing |0〉 and registers 0 and j + 1, . . . , t are in the subspace containing |1〉 (and,
otherwise, U acts as the identity operator). In the case of general α, use the root-swap-like operator (defined
in a previous footnote) instead of the root-swap.
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The other (“junk”) terms are of 1-number 0, 1, and t. Note that terms of different 1-number
are orthogonal. Recall that it suffices to compute the minimum gate fidelity over all pure inputs
|φ〉, because of the joint concavity of the fidelity [8]. Thus, the Gθ gate was effectively applied
with minimum fidelity
√
(t− 2)/t, and the rightmost (t + 1) registers have this same fidelity
with the state |Ψtθ(1)〉, where we define
|Ψtθ(i′)〉 := (1/
√
t− 2i′)
t−i′∑
w=1+i′
eiθw|w{t}〉, (45)
for i′ ≥ 0. To implement a second Gθ gate, we use these same rightmost t registers (whose
state is close to |Ψtθ(1)〉). And so on. In general, we find that U |φ〉|Ψtθ(i′)〉 equals√
t− 2(i′ + 1)
t− 2i′ (Gθ|φ〉)|Ψ
t
θ(i
′ + 1)〉 (46)
plus orthogonal “junk”, where |φ〉 is, again, an arbitrary pure state of a logical qubit. The
gate fidelity of the lth approximation of Gθ is thus at least
√
(t− 2l)/t (for sufficiently large
t). Thus, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 2 (Approximate universal quantum computation in a hidden basis). Let ρ0 be a
density operator on Hn and suppose W is a unitary operator on Hn that can be decomposed
into phase-invariant gates and at most l Hadamard gates. Given ǫ > 0 and a copy of the
reference state |Ψtθ〉 (defined above), one can carry out the quantum computation in the hidden
basis {|0〉 , eiθ |1〉}⊗n of (ρ0,W ) approximately, with fidelity
√
1− ǫ2, if t ≥ ⌈2l/ǫ2⌉.
We say that the approximation algorithm in Theorem 2 is efficient because the size of the phase
reference state need only scale linearly with the number of Hadamard gates implemented, for
constant ǫ. In Section 4.2.1, we show how Theorem 2 can be applied by an adversary to mount
a weak attack on the cryptographic protocol we present in Section 4.2.
We end this section with the following corollary, which summarizes how one can use copies
of |0〉 and |1〉 to create a phase reference state |Ψtθ〉, for unknown and uniformly random θ, in
order to carry out approximate universal quantum computation in a hidden basis.
Corollary 6 (Computation in a hidden basis for unknown and random θ). Let ρ0 be a density
operator on Hn and suppose W is a unitary operator on Hn that can be decomposed into phase-
invariant gates and at most l Hadamard gates. Given ǫ > 0 and t copies each of |0〉 and |1〉,
one can carry out the quantum computation in the hidden basis {|0〉 , eiθ |1〉}⊗n of (ρ0,W ) for
unknown and uniformly random θ ∈ [0, 2π), i.e., effect the operation
ρ0 7→ ρ′0 :=
1
2π
∫
θ
U(θ)WU(θ)†ρ0U(θ)W
†U(θ)†dθ, (47)
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approximately, with fidelity
√
1− ǫ2, if t ≥ ⌈2l/ǫ2⌉.
Proof. Noting that
1
2π
∫ 2pi
0
dθ|Ψtθ〉〈Ψtθ| =
1
t
t∑
w=1
|w{t}〉〈w{t}|, (48)
we can thus prepare the state |Ψtθ〉 for a uniformly random value of θ by preparing a uniformly
random 1-number state, which is easy to do with t copies each of |0〉 and |1〉. The statement
then follows from Theorem 2.
We say that the approximation algorithm in Corollary 6 is efficient because the number of
copies of |0〉 and |1〉 need only scale linearly with the number of Hadamard gates implemented,
for constant ǫ. Note that if ρ0 is phase invariant and we are interested in measuring (after
executing W ) a phase-invariant Hermitian observable M , then we can apply Corollary 6 to
carry out approximate quantum computation in a hidden basis and effectively measure the
observable M on the state Wρ0W
†.10 We hope that Corollary 6 finds application (perhaps
in conjunction with Theorem 2) in interactive protocols (e.g. interactive proofs), where the
parties variously create/send/receive and perform quantum operations on input states (ρ0),
output states (ρ′0), and phase reference states.
4 Applications to public-key authentication
Our motivation is information-theoretically-secure quantum-public-key cryptography, a frame-
work for which was first proposed by Gottesman and Chuang in Ref. [3]; we describe an example
of that framework now.
Let Aδ ⊂ CM be a set of superpolynomially (in log(M)) many quantum states such that,
for every distinct |ψ〉 and |φ〉 in Aδ,
| 〈ψ|φ〉 | ≤ δ (49)
for some positive constant δ < 1. The states in Aδ are sometimes called quantum fingerprints,
and explicit constructions for such Aδ, with |Aδ| ∈ 2Ω(M), are known [12]. A (succinct) classical
description of Aδ is published.
10We have specified that the observable M be phase invariant for two reasons: (1) so that the measurement
statistics from measuring M on ρ′0 are the same as if one measured M on Wρ0W
†; and (2) so that we can
implement the measurement with no approximation error, as follows. Each block Mw of any phase-invariant
observableM = ⊕nw=0Mw can be diagonalized by a phase-invariant unitary Vw. Thus, we can implement M by
first implementing ⊕nw=0V †w and then measuring in the hidden computational basis {|0〉 , |1〉}⊗n.
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As part of the key generation procedure, Alice randomly chooses a |ψ〉 uniformly from Aδ
and keeps this choice secret, but she authentically distributes (e.g., by trusted courier) a limited
number of copies of |ψ〉 among several members of the public (including Bob). The classical
description of |ψ〉, which can be encoded by a bit-string of length Θ(log(|Aδ|)), serves as part
of the private key, while several authentic copies of the state |ψ〉 serve as part of the public
key. Assuming each copy of |ψ〉 is an O(log(M))-qubit state, the maximum number of bits of
information one can extract from T copies of |ψ〉 is O(T log(M)), by the Holevo bound [13, 8].
Thus, as long as T ≪ log(|Aδ|)/log(M), the part of the private key corresponding to |ψ〉 is
protected even if T copies of |ψ〉 exist.
The full private/public key would typically consist of several independent instances of this
setup, that is, Alice independently chooses several states |ψ〉 ∈ Aδ and distributes the corre-
sponding copies. This naturally allows for protocols that are the composition of independent
instances of an atomic protocol, or kernel, that succeeds with only a certain probability. Repeat-
ing the kernel sufficiently many times, with independent |ψ〉-values each time, can amplify the
success probability to an acceptable level. In the case of authentication schemes, “to succeed”
means “to correctly ‘accept’ or ‘reject’ a purported message or entity”.
A more general framework can be obtained by allowing the public key to consist of additional
systems that may depend on the private key; we will use this more general framework in Section
4.2.
We are primarily interested in public-key authentication protocols — either for classical
messages, as in digital signature schemes, or for entities, as in identification schemes — a
general approach to which is the following. Suppose that Aδ also satisfies the condition
〈0|ψ〉 = 0 (50)
for all |ψ〉 ∈ Aδ and some known |0〉 ∈ CM . Alice can easily create states like |0〉+ |ψ〉 (we will
sometimes omit normalization factors) and, more generally, she can perform any computation
in the basis {|0〉 , |ψ〉}⊗n.
Remark 7 (No-Squashing Conjecture). In general, it is not known how to perform such com-
putations efficiently, and we conjecture that it takes superpolynomially (in log(M)) many copies
of a uniformly random |ψ〉 ∈ Aδ to prepare even one copy of |0〉 + |ψ〉, if the procedure is to
work for all |ψ〉 ∈ Aδ. We call this the No-Squashing Conjecture. We call the task of creating
|0〉+ |ψ〉 for every |ψ〉 ∈ Aδ, given copies of |ψ〉, squashing. See the Appendix for more details
about squashing and the No-Squashing Conjecture.
The hope is to use this framework, for example, for Alice to convince Bob that she has prepared
some state (like a signature) that no one without full knowledge of |ψ〉 could have done with
only the limited number of copies of the state |ψ〉 available. Moreover, we are interested in
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reusable schemes, by which we mean that the same private key (and corresponding public keys)
can be used to identify Alice many times or sign many messages from Alice (recall that the
digital signature scheme in Ref. [3] is not reusable: it can only be used to sign one message).
This framework may be suitable for reusable schemes, because, as suggested by our example
protocol in Section 4.2, it seems to allow protocols where Alice does not divulge (to a verifier or
adversary) a significant amount of extra information about the private key (beyond that which
is already available from all the copies of the public key), yet retains some advantage over the
adversary.
Remark 8 (Notation). In our cryptographic setting, the unknown state |ψ〉 is now playing the
role of |1〉. Thus, for this section of the paper, we redefine all the objects (e.g., |w{t}〉, |Ψtθ〉,
|Snw〉, H) that depend on |0〉 and |1〉, by replacing each occurrence of |0〉 with |0〉 and each
occurrence of |1〉 with |ψ〉.
4.1 Insecurity of a class of digital signature schemes for classical
messages
Theorem 1 can be interpreted as a restriction on any digital signature scheme for classical
messages in the above framework. Before we state the result, we give a more detailed description
of such a signature scheme.
Suppose that, in the key generation procedure described in the previous section, Alice chose
K independent values |ψk〉 from Aδ, k = 1, 2, . . . , K. Let x denote the message to be signed.
We assume that the full signature state for message x is a J-fold tensor product of states
J⊗
j=1
σj(|ψk(j,x)〉), (51)
where k(j, x) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K} is a publicly known function depending on the particular scheme,
and each σj(|ψk(j,x)〉) is a density operator on span({|0〉 , |ψk(j,x)〉}⊗n) such that the coefficients
of σj(|ψk(j,x)〉) with respect to the basis {|0〉 , |ψk(j,x)〉}⊗n are publicly known.11 Note that, in
general, σj(|ψ〉) need not equal σj′(|ψ〉) when j 6= j′.
We assume further that the full verification procedure breaks up into J independent proce-
dures, each denoted Pj, one for each σj(|ψk(j,x)〉). Thus, if no adversary interferes, Bob would
apply the procedure Pj to σj(|ψk(j,x)〉) (using his copy of the public key and the message) and
11These coefficients, which may also depend on the message x, are known in that they do not depend on the
private key (classical description of |ψk(j,x)〉). This allows the adversary to compute the conditional probabilities
required for our state preparation algorithm of Section 2.2.
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obtain some measurement statistics. After doing this for all j = 1, 2, . . . , J , he would process
all the statistics and determine whether to “accept” or “reject” the message-signature pair.
Corollary 9 (Insecurity of a class of digital signature schemes). Suppose there is a signature
scheme with signature state and verification procedure as described above. Suppose further
that an adversary can obtain n copies of |ψk(j,x)〉, for all j = 1, 2, . . . , J . Then the scheme is
not information-theoretically secure if, for all j = 1, 2, . . . , J , the procedure Pj applied to the
state σj(e
iθ|ψk(j,x)〉) produces the same statistics as if it were applied to σj(
∣∣ψk(j,x)〉), for any
θ ∈ [0, 2π].
Proof. From Theorem 1, it follows that the adversary can create the uniform mixture over
θ ∈ [0, 2π) of σj(eiθ|ψk(j,x)〉), because this mixture is phase invariant. The procedure Pj applied
to this mixture will also produce the same statistics as if it were applied to σj(
∣∣ψk(j,x)〉), thus
the scheme is not information-theoretically secure.
We note that, for example, Corollary 9 applies to any scheme such that the only public
key states available for use in verification of σj(|ψk(j,x)〉) are copies of |ψk(j,x)〉 (and no other
state dependent on the private key) and the verification procedure uses the copies of |ψk(j,x)〉
only as input to swap-tests12 (or similar tests for symmetry under permutations [12, 14]).
Generally, the corollary implies that the verification procedure for any secure signature scheme
in this framework, where the adversary can obtain sufficiently many copies of |ψk(j,x)〉, will
have to exploit the global phase of the state vector |ψk(j,x)〉 ∈ Aδ determined by its classical
description.
4.2 Example of a cryptographic protocol in this framework
We now give an example of a cryptographic protocol that incorporates many of the ideas we have
presented. The protocol is actually a translation of the honest-verifier identification scheme of
Ref. [15] into our hidden basis setting. The following is an intuitive description (adapted from
Section 4.7.5.1 in Goldreich’s book [16]) of how a secure identification scheme works.
Suppose Alice generates a private key and authentically distributes copies of the corre-
sponding public key to any potential users of the scheme, including Bob. If Alice wants to
identify herself to Bob (i.e. prove that it is she with whom he is communicating), she invokes
12Recall that the swap-test [12, 3] of two registers (labelled 2 and 3) in the states |ξ〉2 and |φ〉3 is a measure-
ment (with respect to the computational basis {|0〉1, |1〉1}) of the control register (labelled 1) of the state
(H1 ⊗ I2 ⊗ I3)(c− swap2,3)(|0〉1 + |1〉1)|ξ〉2|φ〉3/
√
2, (52)
where H1 is the Hadamard gate (applied to register 1) and c − swap2,3 is the controlled-swap gate. The
probability that the state is |0〉1 immediately after the measurement — which corresponds to a pass — is
(1+ | 〈ξ|φ〉 |2)/2. When the registers 2 and 3 are in the mixed states ρ and ρ′, this probability is (1+ tr(ρρ′))/2.
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the identification protocol by first telling Bob that she is Alice, so that Bob knows he should
use the public key corresponding to Alice (assuming Bob possesses public keys from many dif-
ferent people). The ensuing protocol, whatever it is, has the property that the prover Alice
can convince the verifier Bob (except perhaps with negligible probability) that she is indeed
Alice, but an adversary Eve cannot fool Bob (except with negligible probability) into thinking
that she is Alice, even after having listened in on the protocol between Alice and Bob or having
participated as a (devious) verifier in the protocol with Alice several times. An honest-verifier
identification protocol is only intended to be secure under the extra assumption that, whenever
Eve engages the prover Alice in the protocol, Eve follows the verification protocol as if she were
honest. Note that no identification protocol is secure against a person-in-the-middle attack,
where Eve concurrently acts as a verifier with Alice and as a prover with Bob.
As part of the key generation procedure for our protocol, we assume Alice has chosen a
random |ψ〉 ∈ Aδ and has distributed at most r copies of the state
|ψ〉(|0〉+ |ψ〉). (53)
This state is the public key for one iteration of the kernel of the protocol. The parameter r is
the reusability parameter, dictating the maximum number of secure uses of the scheme for a
particular public key.
The kernel of our interactive protocol is the following three steps, which form a typical
“challenge-response” interactive proof. If the kernel is repeated s times in total, then one copy
of the (full) public key (of which there are still r copies in total) would be ⊗si=1|ψi〉(|0〉+ |ψi〉),
where the |ψi〉 are each independently and uniformly randomly picked from Aδ by Alice. The
parameter s is the security parameter, which is chosen after r is fixed.
1. Bob uses |ψ〉 to create the symmetric state |S21〉 = |0〉 |ψ〉 + |ψ〉 |0〉 (as shown in Section
2.2), and sends the leftmost register of this state to Alice.
2. On the received register, Alice performs the logical Hadamard gate H and then measures
with respect to an orthogonal basis {|0〉, |ψ〉, . . .}. If the state of the register immediately
after the measurement is |0〉, then Alice sends “0” to Bob; otherwise, Alice sends “1”.
3. If Bob receives “1”, then he applies the Z gate to the register that he kept (that contained
half of the symmetric state he made in Step 1). Finally, Bob swap-tests this register with
the register containing the authentic copy of |0〉+ |ψ〉 (the swap-test is defined in Section
4.1).
After the kernel is repeated s times, Bob “accepts” if all the swap-tests passed; otherwise, Bob
“rejects”. As a final specification for the protocol, we also stipulate that Alice not engage in
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the protocol more than r times (when there are r copies of the public key in circulation) for a
particular value of the private key.
Before discussing the potential security of this scheme, we note that the honest protocol is
correct because
|S21〉 = (H−1 |0〉)(|0〉+ |ψ〉)− (H−1 |ψ〉)Z−1(|0〉+ |ψ〉); (54)
that is, Bob’s swap-test always passes when the prover is honest (assuming perfect quantum
channels).
4.2.1 Discussion of potential security
Within the hidden basis cryptographic framework, we refer to as black-box attacks those attacks
where Eve does not use any information about the structure of Aδ to help her cheat. In the
following discussion, we restrict our attention to the honest-verifier setting. The following
definition of “security” suffices for our discussion:13
Definition 5 (Security). An honest-verifier identification protocol (for honest prover Alice
and honest verifier Bob) is secure with error ǫ if the probability that Bob “accepts” when any
adversary Eve participates in the protocol as a prover is less than ǫ (assuming that, whenever
Eve engages Alice in the protocol, Eve follows the verification protocol honestly).
One obvious black-box attack that Eve could perform is as follows. Eve can collect r′ :=
(r − 1) copies of |0〉+ |ψ〉, which are in the state
( |0〉+ |ψ〉√
2
)⊗r′
=
1√
2r′
r′∑
w=0
√(
r′
w
)
|Sr′w 〉. (55)
Now, assume Eve performs the inverse of the phase-invariant operation given in Section 2.2,
which maps |Sr′w 〉 7→ |w{r′}〉 with no error. The state thus becomes
1√
2r′
r′∑
w=0
√(
r′
w
)
|w{r′}〉. (56)
13As in Ref. [16], our definition of “security” does not include the completeness of the protocol, which
stipulates that honest Bob should always accept when the prover is honest (this is easily verified for our
protocol). Our definition does not take into account that there may be many different honest provers. As well,
we consider neither the parallel nor serial composability of the identification protocol. See Ref. [16] for more
details in the classical case.
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Note that this state is similar to |Ψr′0 〉, but for the coefficients, which now have non-constant
moduli (see Remark 5). Thus, Eve can use this state as a phase reference in order to mimic
Alice’s Hadamard gate.
In the black-box (honest-verifier) setting, given any ǫ > 0 and r, there indeed exists a
value of s (dependent on r and ǫ) such that the protocol is secure with error ǫ (assuming
perfect quantum channels). For, in this case, the protocol reduces to the honest-verifier-secure
protocol of Ref. [15]. The security proof follows from the work of Bartlett et al. [2] on bounded
quantum reference frames and is a formalization of the following intuition. Note that Alice
always causes Bob’s swap-test to pass. However, Eve’s information about the correct reference
frame is limited to her r samples of it (because Eve cannot extract any further information from
Alice). Since only an infinite number of samples should suffice for Eve to be able to perform
a measurement in the logical Hadamard basis perfectly (as Alice can), there is always some
nonzero probability that Eve causes Bob’s swap-test to fail. With sufficiently large s, Bob
will find such a failure (except with negligible probability). It turns out that s ∈ Ω(r log(r/ǫ))
suffices [15].
A security proof would of course need to consider all attacks — not just black-box ones. Note
that if squashing required only a small number of copies of |ψ〉 (see Remark 7), then Eve could
prepare more copies of |0〉+ |ψ〉 to use as a phase reference for her approximate implementation
of H . This is one way that the security of our scheme depends on the assumed difficulty of
squashing (e.g., the No-Squashing Conjecture); however, even if Eve could somehow transform
her copies of |ψ〉 into one or more copies of |0〉 + |ψ〉, the parameter s could be modestly
increased to account for Eve’s extra samples of the reference frame, assuming there exists an s
such that the scheme is secure for r′ samples of |0〉+ |ψ〉. The security of the scheme depends
more crucially on the weaker conjecture that it is impossible to perform a measurement with
respect to the logical Hadamard basis {|0〉 ± |ψ〉} (given the limited number of copies of |ψ〉)
much more efficiently than with our black-box reference-frame approach (this conjecture is
weaker because if Eve could carry out the measurement, then she could squash).
5 Closing Remarks
By exploiting phase invariance and mimicking properties of coherent states of light, we have
shown how to perform various computational tasks, defined with respect to a hidden compu-
tational basis {|0〉 , |1〉}⊗n, efficiently in the required number of copies of |0〉 and |1〉. We have
shown that such tasks, which were previously not known to be possible, have cryptological
application.
We have identified several open problems, including the squashing problem and the harder
problem of performing measurements with respect to the hidden Hadamard basis {|0〉 ± |1〉}.
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Another open problem is to investigate to what extent state preparation and universal computa-
tion are possible when the assumption that |0〉 and |1〉 come from known orthogonal subspaces
is dropped, that is, when the only promise is that 〈0|1〉 = 0 with |0〉 , |1〉 ∈ A, where A contains
no two states that are equal up to global phase.
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Appendix: Squashing and the No-Squashing Conjecture
The squashing problem can be meaningfully (and nontrivially) defined for a broad class of sets
of states — not just sets of type Aδ. Let A be a set of pure state vectors in C
M such that
no two distinct elements in A are equal up to global phase. (Formally, let {A(M)}M=1,2,...
be a family of sets A(M) ⊂ CM of complex unit vectors expressed relative to the standard
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basis {|0〉, |1〉, |M − 1〉}. For clarity of presentation, we usually omit the “family” notation
{·}M=1,2,....) Let ǫ > 0 be the error tolerance parameter. The pair (A, ǫ) specifies an instance
of the general squashing problem, which is to compute, for every |ψ〉 ∈ A, a state ρ such that
D(σ0,ψ, ρ) ≤ ǫ, (57)
given copies of |ψ〉, where D is the trace distance [8],
σ0,ψ := (|0〉+ |ψ〉)(〈0|+ 〈ψ|), (58)
and |0〉 is some known reference state (which, in general, need not be orthogonal to all |ψ〉 ∈ A).
Note that the classical description of A also specifies a global phase for each possible state vector
|ψ〉, so the ideal target state |0〉+ |ψ〉 is well defined. The set A should be nontrivial, meaning
that it should contain elements that are, pairwise, not orthogonal (as would be the case when
A = Aδ); this is analogous to the problem of quantum cloning, where it is trivial to clone states
that are promised to come from a prescribed orthogonal set.
Define t(A, ǫ) to be the smallest t for which there exists a quantum operation Q such that,
for all |ψ〉 ∈ A,
D(Q((|ψ〉〈ψ|)⊗t), σ0,ψ) ≤ ǫ. (59)
A quantum operation Q that, for some t, satisfies Eq. (59) for all |ψ〉 ∈ A is called an (A, ǫ)-
squasher, because it “squashes” part of the generalized Bloch sphere towards its |0〉-pole. We
view the number t(A, ǫ) as measuring the complexity of the squashing problem instance (A, ǫ).
We assume all |ψ〉 in A are reasonably encoded into qubits and thus take the input size of the
problem to be log(M).
Our cryptographic motivation leads us to look for sets A such that t(A, ǫ) is necessarily large
(for sufficiently small ǫ). For some instances of the general squashing problem, exponential lower
bounds on t(A, ǫ) might be relatively easily obtainable, because it might be the case that, for
subexponential values of t, the states σ0,ψ and σ0,φ are further in trace distance (or, equivalently,
have lower fidelity) than |ψ〉⊗t and |φ〉⊗t. The following example of this shows that the general
squashing problem subsumes the black-box search problem (this fact has already been pointed
out in Ref. [17], though the author of that paper assumes that squashing is an easy task).
Example 2. Denote by F the quantum Fourier transform on CM , so that
F |0〉 = (1/
√
M)
M−1∑
i=0
|i〉. (60)
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For every j = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1, define the state |j∗〉 via
〈i|j∗〉 =
{
+1/
√
M if i = j ,
−1/√M if i 6= j . (61)
Let A2 := {F †|j∗〉 : j = 0, 1, . . . ,M−1} (note that A2 does not have the property that 〈0|ψ〉 = 0
for all |ψ〉 ∈ A2). Noting that |j∗〉 + F |0〉 ∝ |j〉, we can solve the black-box search problem
with a good (A2, ǫ)-squasher, where ǫ is a constant (i.e., if the solution to the search problem
is j, then the black box can be used t times to make t copies of |j∗〉). Thus, the well-known√
M search lower bound applies to t(A2, ǫ). But this is overkill: the lower bound we get from
the fact that quantum operations cannot increase trace distance is larger when ǫ < 1/2, as we
now show. If Q is an (A2, ǫ)-squasher, then we have (for i 6= j)
1− 2ǫ ≤ D(Q((F †|i∗〉〈i∗|F )⊗t), Q((F †|j∗〉〈j∗|F )⊗t)) (62)
≤ D((|i∗〉〈i∗|)⊗t, (|j∗〉〈j∗|)⊗t) (63)
≤
√
1− | 〈i∗|j∗〉 |2t (64)
=
√
1− (1− 4/M)2t, (65)
so that t ≥ log(4ǫ(1− ǫ))/2 log(1− 4/M) and thus, for example, t(A2, 13 , 1) ∈ Ω(M). The
first line follows from several applications of the triangle inequality and the fact that the trace
distance between the squasher’s ideal outputs is 1. In subsequent lines, we have used the
well-known relationship between trace distance and fidelity (see Ref. [8]) and the power series
expansion log(1− x) = −x− x2/2− x3/3− · · · for x ∈ [−1, 1] and the fact that, for x ≤ 1/2,
x+ x2/2 + x3/3 + · · · ≤ x(1 + x+ x2 + · · · ) = x(1− x)−1 ≤ 2x. (66)
The cryptographic framework uses sets of type Aδ, that have, among others, the two prop-
erties defined in Eq. (49) and Eq. (50). The latter property, that 〈0|ψ〉 = 0 for all |ψ〉 in
Aδ, is particular to our version of the framework. The former property of pairwise δ-almost-
orthogonality is a reasonable condition to impose on quantum-public-key cryptography in gen-
eral, in order to avoid a situation where two different private keys correspond to practically
indistinguishable physical scenarios. For example, suppose Alice-x has private key x and Alice-y
has private key y, and x 6= y; we would not want Alice-y to be able to convince Bob that she is
Alice-x with significant probability. This property also rules out trivial lower-bound arguments
based on distinguishability, like in Example 2, because an (Aδ, 0)-squasher does not increase
pairwise distinguishability, by which we mean that, for all distinct |ψ〉 and |φ〉 in Aδ,
D(σ0,ψ, σ0,φ) ≤ D((|ψ〉〈ψ|)⊗t, (|φ〉〈φ|)⊗t) (67)
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for some t ∈ O(polylog(M)); in the particular case of Aδ, the inequality (67) actually holds for a
constant t (dependent on δ). The set A2 in Example 2 has neither of the two properties discussed
in this paragraph, and we cannot see how to harness the provable difficulty of squashing A2 for
potential cryptographic application.
We now state the No-Squashing Conjecture more precisely. Call Aδ efficient if and only if
there is a succinct description of Aδ (so that its classical description may be easily published)
and each state in Aδ is efficiently computable given its classical description (i.e., although we do
not bound Eve’s computational power, we prefer that Alice and Bob are bounded by polynomial
time). Since the trace distance between σ0,ψ and the trivially-preparable mixture |0〉〈0|+ |ψ〉〈ψ|
is 1/2, we take ǫ < 1/2 in the conjecture.
Conjecture 10 (No-Squashing). There exists an efficient Aδ such that
t(Aδ, ǫ) ∈ ω((log(M))k) for all constants k > 0 and any nonnegative constant ǫ < 1/2.
Our choice of the superpolynomial bound in the conjecture corresponds to the usual meaning
of “large” or “inefficient” in complexity theory. We do not claim that proving such a bound has
immediate cryptographic application: recall that no result about the difficulty of squashing is
sufficient for establishing the honest-verifier security of the protocol of Section 4.2.
We also leave as an open problem to find any set A such that the (A, 0)-squasher does not
increase pairwise distinguishability and is not completely positive (or prove no such A exists).
Note that the one-qubit universal-not gate [18], which maps
α|0〉+ β|1〉 7→ β∗|0〉 − α∗|1〉 (68)
for any qubit state α|0〉 + β|1〉, does not increase pairwise distinguishability and is known to
be not completely positive.
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